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Since the very beginning of the organized state as a
recognizable society the control of its military has been in
a fluid equilibrium. The effective powers of the military
and the civilian float upon the sea of homage Daid to them
by the crew of the shirs of state and ebbs and flows in
proportion to the directed intensity of that homage. Cur
democratic system of today reflects that same oscillating
condition.
It is the theme of this paper that the rise and fall
of civil control of the naval forces of the United States is
in consonance with the desires of the American people; that
these desires have made themselves known through the actions
of their elected representatives; that as the populace becomes
fearful for their liberty they yield a portion of that liberty
to grant to the military the absolute control of the military
machine; and that as those fears recede they regain their
control by the simple process of denying funds to the military




THE INFANCY AND ADOLESCENCE OF
THE NAVAL ORGANIZATION
The origin of the United States Navy by the Continental
Congress under the Articles of Confederation was developed
along three lines: (l) the temporary commerce raider forces,
to prey on the British shipping supplying the besieged British
troops in Boston, (p) the surely military forces on Lake
Champlain to resist the expected British invasion from that
area, and (3) the sea-going type of a naval organization.
The Continental Army wished to deny supplies to the
besieged troops, the shipping interests desired to protect
their maritime interests, and the Congress wished to obtain
their independence of Great Britain. Here we have in the very
beginning of the nation's history the combined military,
economic and political forces joined in concerted effort to
create legislation in favor of a specific form of military
activity.
Although the impetus behind this original naval
program consisted of the separate forces, the plan was not
kl. 0. Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution




the unanimous opinion of the Congress. The body in Congress
supporting the sea-going naval program consisted of the
maritime New England Colonies who depended uoon their maritime
and fishing fleets for their livelihood. The Southern Colonies,
not too concerned with maritime enterprise and not bothered
particularly by the depredations of the British fleet, were
quite vocal in their objections to the expenditure of money
for this purpose, but, as they were in the minority, they were
unable to prevent the adoption and execution of the measures
that resulted in the creation of the Continental Navy.
The American sea-going commerce raider cruisers and
Congressionally approved privateers did not play a vital role
in the War of the Revolution. They failed to cripple either
overseas commerce or military communications of the British
Empire. They played a. particularly important part in shaping
the naval policy of the United States for years to come and
therein lies the greatest damage that they wrought. The ships
of the Navy took some six million dollars in less than two
hundred prizes but the privateers accounted for six hundred
prizes and eighteen million dollars in spoils of war.
The people of the nation believed that their war-
mobilized Navy was a success because it was self-supporting
and had been recruited from their own standing militia of
patriotic seamen. They feared the political as well as
economic effect of maintaining a navy in peacetime, so during
the first term of President Washington and his Financier-
Treasurer Robert Morris, the gradual process of liquidating
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the Navy began. This liquidation was opposed in theory by
Washington and Morris as well as other men of political and
military stature. General Washington stated, "No land force
can act decisively unless it is accompanied by a maritime
superiority." 2 Thomas Jefferson took the mid-road view,
"A small naval force then is sufficient for us and a small
one is necessary. "3 John Rutledge, a Southerner, stated,
HWe must hold our country by courtesy unless we have a Navy. 11
Alexander Hamilton entered into the economic and political
ramifications of the program by saying, "With a Navy,
American Statesmen could bargain with great advantage for
commercial privileges. A price would be set not only uoon
our friendship but uoon our neutrality. "5 Even though these
men were in accord in the Idea that a navy was required by
the new nation, and that a naval policy and program were
required, they were unable to overcome the political and
economic obstacles preventing the retention of the Navy or
the fear of the people at establishing a standing naval force.
George Washington summed up these fears in writing in IffS:
The other point is the jealousy, which Congress
unhappily entertains of the Army, and which, if reports
-Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of
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are right, some Of bour to establish. You Ray
rest assured that there Is nothing Bora injurious, or
more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the c ly
received orinion, which under proper limitations is
certainly true, that standi rales are dangerous to
State* The prejudices in other countries have only
prone to the?'; in time of peace, and these from their not
having in general c^ses any of the ties, the concerns,
or the interests of citizens, or any other dependence,
than but what flowed from their military employment;
in short, froffl their being mercenaries, hirelings. It
is our policy to be -prejudiced against them in time of
war; though they are citizens, having -11 of the ties and
interests of citizens, and in most gases properly totally
unconnected with the military llne.°
The policy-determining organ under the Articles of
Confederation was the Continental Congress. This Congress
had authority to "allow- expenditures for the cessson defense
but had no power to levy taxes or to compel the States of the
Confederacy to contribute funds to the common treasury for
oh expenditures. Although a standing committee of on?
delegate from each state was appointed to handle th< • neral
affairs of the Congress when it was not In session, and th-.t
committee was expressly empowered to build and equip a ns.vy,
it could take no steos in this direction "until nl» more
of the thirteen States, In longresa asi ted, should ascer-
tain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense . . .
of the United States," and "agree upon the number of vessels
of war to be built or nurchaoed . . . . M ?
Sprout and sprout, loc. cit .
7k, K, Earls (ed. ), The Federalist (Men York: The




These constitutional ambiguities were not the only
obstacles. The sectional cleavages of Congress were as
strong in those days as they are today. The western frontier
states, though not actually states at the time, were repre-
sented by their neighboring states to the east of them due to
the desires of the eastern state to be neighborly and to have
a buffer between himself and the ever present Indian threat
to the Vest* These agricultural states could see no reason
for the building of a naval force but were quite interested
in the creation of a standing army to protect thein from the
continuous Indian menace that was on their doorsteps. The
maritime states desired protection of their maritime fleets,
but not to the extent of cresting such a large navy that
would appear discourteous to any foreign naval power with whom
they might trade.
Thus the Continental Congress, torn by divided counsels
and incapable of replenishing its treasury in rapport of any
naval program, endorsed the navy in principle and recommended
further study of the question—which measure was soon allowed
to die of inaction.
The Constitutional Convention of 17&7 adopted without
debate and with unanimous consent the investment of Congress
with the power "to lay and collect taxes ... to nay the
debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare
of the United States.", as well as specifically authorizing
Congress "to provide and maintain a navy." As the post
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convention struggle for ratification of the new Constitution
by the several states progressed, the navy clause was the
subject of terrific argument, almost coinciding with the
sectional, social and economic groupings of differences of
opinion of the day that resulted In the two political parties,
the Hamiltonlan-Federalist and the Jeff^rsonian-Reoublican.
This writer believes that the depredations of the Barbary
Pirates upon American shipping at the same time that the
State ratification conventions were in process did more to
permit the passage of this section of the Constitution than
any concerted effort by the proponents of a naval program.
The Nation was young and was still flushed with victory over
the British. Now an infidel sovereign was insultingly
demanding tribute—how else could such an insult be revenged
(for the present or prevented in the future) except by naval
forces? Although the Constitution was finally ratified with
the naval clause the blackmail of the Dey of Algiers continued;
it was not until the national embarrassment reflected itself
upon the Congress that any action was taken to create a
national navy.
The Federalist party in power, which derived its chief
suooort from the commercial and shipping interests along the
North Atlantic seaboard and from the tidewater aristocracy of
southern planters, embraced those interests who favored a
Federal Navy. Although In complete control, the party resisted
Charles A. Beard, The Idoa of National Inte:-:'-^
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), chap. II.
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interlor and exterior influences itt " 1 ifcute a
naval program because of the sxtrei a v -o Piousness of the
fiscal oonditlon of the Hation'fl treasury. The Confederacy
had left everything connected rltfe Its finance in s state of
alinobt inextricable eonfua H
°
On July 29, 1775, *&* Continental Q tee resolved,
that Michael Hillegas, and George Clyaer, Eeqra., bo and
they are thereby appointed Joint treasurers of the
EJaited Colonies j that the Ire ere reside in riiiia-
delphia, and that they shall give bond, with surety,
for the faithful perform hoc of their office ... in
trust for the United Colonies.
and followed on September 25, 1775 to resolve,
That a Committee of accounts or claims be now raised
to consist of -ne member from each of the Unit*
Colonies, to whom all accounts against the Continent
are to be referred, who are bo examine and report upon
the same, in order for payment, seven of them to be a
quorum.
and on July JO, lJ7o resolved,
That ell public claims and accounts that are at this time
unsettled, be referred to the Committee of the Treasury
and that the Committee of Claims be discharged from
proceeding further upon any claims or accounts; and that
all of the books and papers now la the hands of the
committee of claims, be delivered to the auditor general.
and on august 6, 1776,
Mr. Clymer, one of the joint treasurers, being appointed
a delegate to Congress, by the Convention of renslyvanla.
Resolved, that for the future, there be only one con-
tinental treasurer*
°8prout and Sprout, oo. clt .
,
p. 32.
XUF. W. Powell, Control of Federal Expenditures; A
Dccrmcntgry History, 1775-lg9 2+ (Va Sainton P. C. : The
Brook in jts institution, 1929) , P* 3*
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From the foregoing it can be seen that the legislative
body of the Revolution was having the same problems of organi-
zation and re-organization that confront the Congress of
today. The delegates protested the committee system of
supervision of expenditures because there was no one person
responsible for the committee's actions, and for the same
reason reduced the number of Treasurers to one person. As the
financing of the Revolution became more and more complex, a
committee on Treasury Reorganization was appointed in April
of 177& and recommended on August 13, JL77& that* (spelling and
capitalization follow original textj „,,
it appears to your Committee the following Particulars
should be attended to in the Business referred to them:
1st. That no more Persons should be appointed than are
necessary: Since Numbers increase the Expence, delay
Business and give greater room for Corruption and the
Concealment of Frauds, Indolence or Inattention.
2ndly. That there be proper Checks devised to prevent
as much as possible Those who are Intrusted with the
Public Monies from converting it to their own Use.
And those who are to examine the Public accounts from
Collusion with the Creditors of the Republic, or with
its Debtors.
3rdly. That Congress be enabled to see with Precision
the Manner of Expenditures, and the Amount, and know the
state of public Debts, and the Produce of the public
Revenue.
. . . That for conducting the Affairs of the Treasury
there be three principal Officers, a Comptroller, a
Treasurer, and an Auditor . . . . **•
Thus in 1773> only three years after the initial appointment
of the joint treasurers of the United States, financial
reorganization was in process. Such reorganization was
instituted at the express wish of the people and directed at






i , because "large accounts of the several staff depart-
to In the ar»y are outitanking and unsettled, . . . and
J • necessary that they be speedily and finally adjusted
in order- that all disbursements may be cleerly ascertained
and arrears discharged bo that public business will not puffer
peat prejudice therefroa. . . ,**
Th? Continental Congress, baring struggled nlghtliy to
create an American Savy that would be effective on a continuous
basis, felt the voice of the people n t the en^ of the war and
set about to liquidate It completely. By the end of 17<$5 a11
of ths shins had been sold or ,^iven away, leaving the United
States, under the articles cf Confederation, with neither a
navy nor s naval prograa. But there was left for th*5 new
Congress a definite bi-partisan attitude concerning naval
affairs, as well a^ ths debts incurred by the nav^l forces
during the Revolution* This attitude was not effected by the
leesons that should have been learned fron the lets war—in
fact, those lessons were forgotten completely es the vear
ended. The neople, although eolit on the idee of a navy or
not a navy by their geographical locations and avocstionsj
were in accord with the idea that ths militia style of military
was the only style suitable for this new democratic
nation* They reasoned that this machine had won the w?r
against superior forces nnd. therefore would b^ indomitable in






They argued that a standing army and navy was a wasted expense
and a constant danger—for a military machine has but one
purpose, to fight, and its very existence invites attack as
well as creates the attitude within its men and among those
who sun-no rt it that they are being retained for this nuroose
so to fulfil their destiny they will find or create a battle.
During the years under President Washington the navy was not
in being but the arguments for its creation continued. The
act of 17S9i which created the IfaP Department, even went so
far as to stimulate that the 'secretary of War, under the
President, should have jurisdiction over the naval forces,
as well as the land forces, of the United States. -' C-eneral
Knox, then Secretary of War, inquired into the costs of
building and equipping a navy but Congress was so adamant
about the subject thr?t a bill was never presented on the floor
in either House. In 1791* Thomas Jefferson, returning from
France to become Secretary of State, championed a navy for the
express tmr^ose of chastising the Barbery Powers who t^ere
beleaguring American shirking in European vat^rs. Congress
still resisted these -pressures because of the published opinion
that the state of the Nation's finance would not permit it
but basically because the majority of the ^eo~le did not desire
an active naval force in being.
In 179^ "the European War of the French Revolution
brought the matter to a head because of the Aaaaglng effect
^U.S., Congress, Annals of Congress , Vol. I,
PT) . IJ-9, 57, i^lk
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that the British alliances had on the increased depredations
upon American shipping. The Federalists, utilizing this
effect to rally a few more votes from the Republicans,
succeeded in carrying through a bill to construct and equip
a naval force. This bill was the result of a great deal of
lltlcal maneuvering so in its enforcement there were a great
many political debts to be paid. The Treasury De^rtment,
which orocured the materials of war at that time, was forced
to centre ct lor cannon from Maryland and Connecticut, ball
end. iron ballast from Ne'w Jersey and Pennsylvania, timber
from North and South Carolina and Georgia (with crews to cut
the timber recruited from Massachusetts, Rhode Island and
Delaware as well as the camenfcers to shaoe it), suoolies
from New London, Self York and Philadelphia. There was a
con bract for sails from Boston and miscellaneous supplies
from the .>ther states to balance out the overall expenditures.
This distribution of the shipbuilding resources
procurement was not accidental but done deliberately, in
addition to the pork-barrel aspects, in order to popularize
the RsYJ in all of the Ration's states and communities in
hopes to Insure legislation to continue the Navy upon a
permanent basls« Although in l7 :jo there was a partial 'peace'
established with the Doy of Algiers and it appeared that the
need for the Navy was over, one administrators of these
contracts had spread their subtle propaganda so well that the
President was allowed to continue work on the ships already
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started with the money already on hand. As the work continued
and the money diminished, a skillful bit of political
neuverlng was berun to obtain new atonies for the final out-
fitting of the ships. This maneuver v Loosed in the
beginning but vat saved in the end by the diplomatic crisis
between the States and Fr-nce in 1791 which stirred the r>eorle
again into a warlike fervor to protect American interests on
the high seas so the warshi^ construction program was renewed*
In 1797 the Federalist rarty brought in John
as President and captured control of both houses. This
complete control of the government by a navy-minded party was
the r»al beginning of the United States Navy. Although fought
at every turn by the Agrarian inland factions of both parties
the Federalists succeeded in passing bill after bill in
support of the Navy and in the group was the one creating the
Navy Department. President Adams selected a Georgetown,
Maryland, Federalist and prosperous merchant by the name of
Oeorg* Stoddert <">,s the first Secretary of the Navy. Adams'
choice was a wise one because Stoddert was an energetic execu-
tive and a capable administrator. Serving from 179& to 1901
he nurtured the mushroom growth of the Navy through the
hostilities with France and while so doing laid a firm founda-
tion for a sound future dev tnt of the Navy.
feh ugh Stoddert was Party to creatine a strong navy
with President Adams and the Federalist party he was also
x Paulli-;, op. olt ., p. 1001.

an accomplice in the increase of the national expenditures
from six million at the beginning of the administration to
eleven million at the end. This gigantic increase created
consternation in Congress and even the most rabid Federalists
quailed before the onslaught of public pressure opposed to
the continuation of such exorbitance. The rising Jeffersonlan
party, comprised of the agrarian interests, urban workers and
tradesmen, were represented by a congressional leader by the
name of Gallatin. Gallatin was a native of Switzerland, but
was now from western Pennsylvania and was s flnancial genius
second to none in his day, as well as an accomplished orator,
politician and farmer. It was natural for President
Jefferson to install his loyal supporter as Secretary of the
Treasury and it was just as natural for Gallatin to pay
particular attention to expenditures that were in any way
connected with the Navy's growth and expansion. The Army was
strongly supported by the frontier and. could not be curtailed
without losing support of those frontier states; therefore,
as the Jeffersonlan party had the platform of reduced expendi-
tures of the Government and were opposed to naval expansion
as well, the Navy was bound to suffer from their administra-
tion. Gallatin, in his office as Secretary of the Treasury,
found little to commend with how the Treasury had been run
in prior years and began a searching inquiry into the actual
control of the expenditures of federal funds. Jefferson's
message to Congress in 1&02 observed that "funds appropriated
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for certain -urposes should be expended for those purposes"
and that processes should be established to guarantee this
policy and "that discretionary rowers over the expenditures
of public money (by the various departments of the government)
should be eliminated. ,( 5 This was a direct result of the
investigations of Gallatin into some expenditures made by
Secretary of the Navy Stodc.ert wherein he had rmrchased ship-
yards costing in excess of the amount specified in the
appropriation act, utilizing funds slated for other expendi-
tures.
As a result of Gallatin's recommendations the functions
of the Accountants of the Navy Department and the War Depart-
ment were reduced to those of auditors and the control of
military expenditures was brought back into the Treasury
Department. The Accountants, established in 1792 for the War
Department and 179& for the Navy had had much more than the
present day military comptroller's control of the military
purse. They drew from the Treasury the funds that were author-
ized by Congress for Naval and Army expenditures and then
doled out these funds at the request of the Department
Secretary for any purpose he desired. They answered to no
audit but their own and satisfied the Treasury's rare curiosity
by a running balance of mere figures showing- amounts received
and amounts on hand.
Here for the second time we see the military control
of money being curtailed and the actual amount of money
^poweii^ pp. clt ., p. 177*
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apoortioned to them reduced, ps the sentiments of the voters
swung toward economy and liberty as the threat of war cr
actual war disappeared ov^r the horizon.
Although Jefferson himself was a navy supporter and
had published his ideas along that line in 1J&0 and had
supported the passage of the Navy Act of 179^ » ne had become
a member of a political party that was strongly anti-navy and
could be expected to follow the party line. He depended upon
Gallatin for more naval advice than he did his Secretary of
the Navy, Robert Smith. Smith was from a maritime family
long associated with shipping and commerce, but was of an
easy-going nature, had little desire or capacity for leader-
ship and yielded to the superior oratory of Gallatin and the
pressure of the party. So in March 1$01 the Navv was again
upon the auction block for the highest bidder.
In May of 1S01, Jefferson, driven by national pride
to the extent to override the objections of his party, sent
a small force to the Mediterranean to attempt to punish
aggressions against American shipping. This force found that
the ruler of Tripoli had declared war on the r^nny United States
and began operations of war against them. Jefferson was
thereby forced to retreat from his demobilization plan for the
Navy in order to continue the war and the Navy wps saved again.
After half-hearted legislation and costly economies
the war was concluded in I0O7 with the Trioolitan powers but
the European war had resumed. The Jeffersonian party continued
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to ignore the threat of this war and continued to cut down
the naval strength. Evidently this policy was popular because
it elected Federalist James Madison to the presidency who
continued the policy as he c&ffle in to office in 1&09, and
continued it until public pressure forced the party to change
its approach to the problem.
The tfar of 181? was a complete fiasco from beginning
to end for the Navy. Although we are reputed to have 'won'
illustrious battles against the British, these Bkirmishefl
did not prevent the British from invading our Capital as well
as crippling our economy with her effective blockade of our
commerce. The war over, and the Nation again 'victorious 1
over superior force?, afforded additional x^roof to the
surnorters of the no-navy program that naval expenditures
were a waste and that we could depend for our protection unon
our militia navy in the future ao we had in the past as well
as uron our distance from all foreign powers with any aggre~
sive tendencies. Although in 1313 "the Immediate effect of the
cessation of the war allowed for the construction of more shlos
and later, at the Insistence of e rarticularly energetic
Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Crown in shield, for the Naval
Act of 12>l6 which called for "the gradual increase of the
Navy,' 1 the end result of the War of 1012 was to almost bankrupt
tha Nation by the results of the British blockade which finally
caused the loss of American exoort markets and culminated in
the derrres^ion of 1021.
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A particularly important effect of the war, which I
believe to have been most deleterious to the well-being; and
future progress of the Navy, was the enhancement of the Navy
Bureau autocracy within the professional naval bureaucracy.
Prior to the war the Secretary had controlled the Navy with
a small staff but with the increased size of the Navy and the
increased funds it their disposal he had to have help in its
control. The Congress, full of distrust of the mi?.itary,
created a Board of Commissioners comprised of three naval
Cartalns to supervise administration and advise the Secretary,
but control of policy was to remain where the Constitution
placed it—in civilian hands. This was a simple decree to
issue but quite difficult to enforce. The naval bureaucracy
grew in numbers and solidarity. As it grew, its voice &-rew
stronger and the problem of controlling it grew greater.
The essence of this problem was how to combine the expert
knowledge of this professional naval bureaucracy, the politi-
cal leadership of the civilian executive, and the representative
function and legislative power of Congress together in a
concerted effort directed toward the betterment of the common
welfare of the people.
From 1316 until lg&O the American Navy was a major
issue in Congress but the anti-navy faction managed to retain
the upper hand and keep the appropriations low enough to
prevent even gradual growth of the Navy. President John
Quincy Adams followed Monroe in 1324- but the economy-minded
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Congress, fresh out of the recession of 1021, resisted naval
preparedness. Andrew Jackson in his inaugural address of
1S29 denounced standing armies as "dangerous to free govern-
ments in time of peace" and allowed that the Navy was less
dangerous, "but the bulwark of our defense is the national
militia." Jackson and his party kept down all military
expenditurea for his first four years in office but during
the last two years of his second term, due to a rupture of
diplomatic relations with France as well as the large surplus
revenue pouring into the nation's Treasury, began instituting
a policy of increased expenditures for naval defense. The
Navy during this time had been busy in far-off places on
foreign station and was little noticed by the people of the
nation. They had become deeply intrenched in the Washington
merry-go-round of bureaucracy and legislative procedures.
Resting on their laurels of past victories they were cautious
not to disturb the state of things as they were because they
remembered too well the lessons of the oast when their ships
were laid up on the beach. They were unobtrusively perform-
ing their assigned missions while cultivating Congressmen and
state officials in order to be assured of the appropriations
they were presently receiving.
The administration of Van 3uren and Harrison and
Tyler from IS37 to 13^5 was a turbulent one as far as the
nation waa concerned but the Naval Establishment continued
without a policy of any sort for future growth along with the
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nation because of the apathy of the people. Its civilian
leadership and imagination, enthralled with the Industrial
revolution of industry and the prospects of arriving some of
the results of this revolution to the Navy, werp resisted by
both Congress and the naval professional bureaucracy. Congress
resisted because it felt that the protection of the westward
expansion was more important th^n the protection of our coast-
lines by any more force than we now had, and the bureaucracy
resisted because they wished to maintain the status quo.
The crisis of 1340-^1 with the British, the suppression of the
African slave trade, the annexation of Texas and the develop-
ment of the now Oregon-Washington states were all important
sectional Issues and kept Congress occupied.. The Whig party
launched a successful naval program after the war scare with
Britain and as a result Congress saw fit to disband the Naval
Board of Commissioners and establish the Navy Department into
separate bureaus without collective functions or responsibi-
lities. This procedure was publicized as an improvement in
the organization but there were some who said that the main
purpose behind it was the intent to divide the now strong
Navy Department into separate units that would be easier to
control. 12&2 saw an appropriation of over eight million
dollars for the Navy alone. This appropriation was made x^ith
much furor in Congress because the sectional cleavages that
were present in 1776 were still with it in even greater force.
This time, I ovever, the rork barrel entered into the picture
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and distorted it beyond all reason. The snoils system or
distribution of procurement which the Navy had introduced
earlier in order to publicize its program now backfired ^nd
caused the most inefficient distribution of the Havy*l appro-
priated funds as well as inefficient administration of their
application.
The Democratic party rode into power in lMk$ upon the
platform of territorial expansion to the westward. Although
the Navy did not develop itself Internally during this period,
its civilian executives were constantly attempting to force
this development. Upon the acquisition of California there
arose in the minds of the people the need for a two ocean
navy and the large navy proponents in the Congress were the
first to nrorose naval expansion. The peacefully settled
Oregon disputes had awakened the dormant thoughts of the people
about defense of their nation, particularly when the other
navies of the world had become equipped with steam vessels and
were now narrowing the great moat that we had been depending
upon for protection. Steam also meant that our navy was
obsolete with sail. Even if we knew that enemy fleets were
steaming our way, our sailing fleet, stationed as it was in
the faraway ports of the world and along our ooasts, could not
arrive in time to offer protection.
The nation was beginning to flex its muscles in this
-eriod because the Immense industrialization and western
expansion had stirred the pulse of every living American.
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The Mexican War In IS^S-lS^, in which the Navy proved Its
usefulness, was a result of this stirring- of 'manifest
dertiny 1 of the nation. The Treasury in 1$5° had a large and
increasing iurplua revenue but due to the split in the Whig
party over the slavery issue, the succession of Fillmore to
the Presidency after the death of Taylor, left no one to lead
Congress in the direction of naval expansion. As a result,
Congress took the issue as a political football. It utilized
the desires of the people for a strong navy to build up a
spoils system that has plagued the Naval Establishment to
this day. Instead of building modern steam warships that were
laid down by naval architects, designed for war, it subsidized
the mercantile interests by paying for the construction of
steam merchant ships, which they said "could be converted in
$as« of war." Although naval engineers had pioneered the
development of the screw prorellor, Improved upon the ordnance
systems, and had requested that industry be allowed to produce
armor relate for shins of war, Congress ^e.^e them only token
respect for their ideas. Th<= additional navy yards that were
built for specific Congressmen could have raid for a new fleet
and the yards were only in business because the present fleet
was so old that each ren^ir was almost like new construction.
In 1352 the Democrats recaptured the Presidency from
the Whigs and began a strong naval program with the almost
unanimous consent of the people. Corrrrodore Perry opened the
ports of Japan in 1-35^ and Secretary of the Navy Dobbin
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utiiized this favorable publicity to give additional impetus
to his aggressive leadership Of the naval expansion and
modernization program. The naval bureauera07 dawdled along
behind the Secretary, however, and did not support him with a
vigorous plan of execution. The ships that they wanted were
no iuore than sailing vessels with auxiliary engines. They
neglected completely the lessons of the past wars and based
their requirements upon shallow draft vessels. Tor eoastal
defense. They failed to observe the oomplete change in the
fleets of the foreign nations—who were all equipped with
armored and steel, steam powered, ocean-going men-of-war that
could out-steam and outgun any of our Ships afloat. Of course
it must be remembered that the Navy was playing at politics
at the time and could obtain all of the support it wanted from
the strong Southern bloc in support of the shallow draft
vessels program where they could depend upon no one particular
group for support of the large armored ship programs. Each
attempt of Congress to obtain money for naval construction of
Ship! for the open sea brought up the question of whether these
shi-->8 would be used to suppress the si >ve trade and the anti-
navy, anti-slavery Senators Joined forces with the Southern
bloc to defeat the bill because they felt that the slave trade
issue was being used to cloak the real intent of creation of




The period Just prior to the Civil var and during it
had all indications of being the beginning of the awakening*
of the American people to the mandatory requirements of a
modern navy, but such was not the case. Although the iron-
clad, steam powered, floating fort,, the Kerrimac, in its
popular battle with the Monitor would appear to force the
iseue, the expense of the war was bo great that no narty or
faction supported any naval program. The lessons again were
that our policies of ooastal defense and commerce raiding
contributed but little to the war effort, but these lessons
were hastily forgotten in the internal rebuilding of the
country's economy. The American Navy went back to sail to
save money and the wooden vessels stored on the ways rotted
away for lack of upkeep. Politics, graft and corruption ate
away at the heart of the (fatal Establishment and a bitter
Struggle between the bureau heads for survival reipned. The
Line KaYT thwarted the attempts of the civil Secretaries to
bring order out of this chaos and the House and Senate Naval
Affairs Comr.ittees had little to offer in the way of a con-




the Navy was no longer required and was allowed to sink into
a state of desuetude due to the disinterest of the people of
the United States, a mistake that would cost them millions to
rer^ir in the future.
In l£$l the Republican party came into power with
General Garfield as President and, for the first time in six
years, the presidential party was the riarty in control of both
houses of Congress. The Secretary of State, James G. Blaine,
was a strong representative of the union of strong nationalism
and resurgent mercantilism that was forcing the American
nation into the hurly-burly of international politics. The
American public was interested in the islands of the Pacific,
the Far East, the isthmian canal in Panama and was vocal in
its demands for a navy to enforce its interests. The House
Naval Affairs Committee waa stirred into action as a result
and the naval bureaucracy was eager this time to aid whoever
was willing to espouse its cause. Garfield chose a southerner
from Louisana, W. H. Hunt, for his Secretary of Navy and
luckily happened upon a man that was interested and well
informed about the Navy. Garfield's interest was to obtain a
man from the South for representation in his Cabinet as a matter
of party doctrine but for one year at least the Navy was con-
trolled by a man that drew on the professional advice, presented
sound naval -lans and programs to Congress for action and
created the first Navy-Congress informal discussion group to
iron out the problems of each group prior to legislative
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proeeedings. The assassination of Garfield disrupted this
excellent beginning Df the Navy's resurgence but President
Arthur strongly endorsed Hunt's as and Instructed his
Secretary of the Havy, '•'. E, Chandler, from Hew Hampshire,
to carry on In the same (Banner* Cfhandler had an abundance of
energy, a good 3ense of organisation and a strong interest in
naval reconstruction. Aithougi his administration was criti-
cized for some political pork-barrelling in the issuance of
Bhlp-bullding 3 ontracts, he did give great service to the
ry in poshing through Ihe rebui ag of the Havy in face of
great technical and political llfflenities. Here Is the first
sxample of ti y ' !
;
protected from the politicking of
the leglsli fclve groups by their civil Secretary.
Neither President Cleveland nor his Secretary of the
j-, . C. Whitney, were overly enthusiastic about the naval
programs but bee-use of their financial and geographic
(eastern seaboard) backgrounds were in favor of a general
strong navy policy* Party feeling was strong in the latter
part of the nineteenth century and party policy was the guide-
line Tzr any politician no matter what his stature* The
Republicans were affillat S Lth industrialism and were for
larger and more rapid reco is truction of the Ravy while the
Democrats we in favor of s small navy concent. Neither
osrty, however, would yield to the other on any bit of legis-
lation even if the opponent were espousing a program identical
with their platform. A Democratic President dealing with a
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Re-ublican (big navy) Congress would still find it difficult
to effect a program favoring a big navy. Patronage,
favoritism and the spoils system in general made for much
confusion and waste as well. Chandler (under President Arthur)
attempted to sidetrack this system by awarding contracts for
naval vessels to private yards rather than to the political,
graft ridden naval yards but he, too, was playing favorites
with industry.
The internal administration of the Navy was at fault
at this time as well. Each bureau was independent and
Struggling against the other for its share of the appropria-
tion dollar and the Secretary, overburdened with the
administrative detail and political ramifications of his very
large organization did not have the administrative or lesral
power to bring the bureaus into line. Whitney was the first
Secretary to bring the Navy and Congress together and now we
find that he bagaa the process of bringing the Navy's own
bureaus into cooperation with each other.
The Navy was still sr>lit on the conversion to steam
issue, the use of armored, wood or steel ships and disagreed
v on the basic ^olicy of coastal defense-commerce raider ty^e
operations or control of the seas. With the professional
sailor so much at sea and the legislative body still split on
the same policy and the large-small navy split between parties,




Cleveland's second tern Secretary of Navy, H. A.
Herbert of Alabama, was Inspired, as was most of the world,
by Caotain A. T. Mahan and his strong command at sea, capital-
shin theory of naval defense of the Western Hemisphere. Mshan
was a career naval ofiicer of no particular renown when he
was assigned to the newly created Naval War College as an
instructor. Relaxing from the strenuous life at sea, Mahr.n
had time to compile his theories in book form, bringing out
two related philosophies, the theory of national prosperity
and destiny founded uoon a program of mercantilist ic imperial-
ism and the other a pure and simple theory of naval strategy
and defense. Although the recession of 1393 held back
Herbert ' s ftggre s s 1ve saapa ign and h i s oaffipa ign w? s s omewhatat
odds with the small navy elatform of the Democratic party,
the Sino-Jaoanese 'ar battles!ilp sea battles, the Venezuelan
boundary crisis tfith Great Britain and the Cuban crisis with
Spain joined forces to Impress the people of the necessity of
maintaining a navy somewhat comparable to the other navies of
the world.
The Democratic administration of Cleveland began the
capital shin exoansion program of the Navy but it remained for
the Republican party to continue it to its completion. In 1$97
the Republicans came into power with William McKinley and a
weak, platform of continued enlargement of the Navy that had
been casually slionec into the background due to the Party's
difficulty with the agrarian Democratic contest for the
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election. T e Secretary of Navy, J. D. Lonn: fro; Massachusetts,
was equally passive about the navy expansion as was the Cl ief
of the Navy Bureau of Navigation, Admiral A. S. Crowninshield,
his chief advisor on personnel and technical matters. Mckinley
would have had a peaceful office if he had not been politically
maneuvered Into selecting Theodore Roosevelt as Assistant
8eere1 of the Navy.
Roosevelt was an ardent dlsoiple of Mahati and a
militant nationalist* &e took charge of th« Havy Department
in every way anc worked night; anr" day building a th« Navy
with the funds on hand and Inveigling the Von rresa and the
people into aeeeptlng hie views ur^cr n tlonal power and nolicy.
clng advantage of Secretary Long's absene« froa his office
for a few hours shortly after the unexplained ~i Lon aboard
the battleship Maine in Havana harbor, Roosevelt ] sed the Navy
on h full war footing. Alt' augh this high- nded aotion did
not start the .Spanish American War lmmsdlately it did create
considerable thought toward the subject enc! gave additional
impetus to naval pl« i tg for such a war.
In late 1"?7 Hoosevelt sent Gommodore Bewey on a tour
of f s Pacific to ase Xt and train the fleet for an attack
upon the Spanish possessions in the Pacific should war
com enc^. °n war was declared in April of 1 Dewey was
well trained prepared to enter and conquer Manila and to
scuttle the Spanish Pacific Fle-t in one short battle that was
s complete v c sit oould not control the strategic or
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taotical maneuvering of the Atlantic Fleet; it was too close
to Washington and was commanded by old Line Admirals who had
little respect for this upstart of an Assistant Secretary.
While the command vacillated and its directives conflicted on
the problsa of what to do %^oi*t the 8p nish fleet, the popula-
tion of the Atlantic eeaboarc". beoane panic-stricken at the
03 :vc that t 1 -.smy fleet was about to ravage their shores.
Congress aros aln to call for coastal defense 'ay the naval
forces j e day was almost lost for the Uavy feat for the
li sly location of the enemy fleet in t' oor of Santiago
-/here ther were blockade* ! ally force-:' to set
ultl ate destruction* Although the aati n h I forcibly entered
into the international scene by her ;s in this war she
continued to resist the pressures t a navy comparable to
1
»] Intern tlonal stature* ained eo ling stations
thr mt fcJ o Pacific, had firm bases aa<3 fleet stations in
the Carrlbean, yet was reluctant to com; it herself uo the
aofitly maintenance of a fleet in being*
The popularity of Theodore Roosevelt forced his party
to couple his with MoKlaley In order to assure retention of the
party 1 * seat in the White B -». is attempt to bury this
active Navy i rter boos aged on f : v with -cKinley's
th and the aavy ~- :r tin on the way to complete reeontruo-
tioa* With Roosevelt the I ' >licy strong mercantilism
sad Bom; and of the seac entered the executive depart s ot of the
States* tender his tutela e :: anifest destiny feeling
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arose in the hearts of the American peorle, and ooupled with
this feelJ n was the rebirth of the desire for a la %vy.
Roosevelt utili itrat tlsal maneuvering
possible to wheedle the last red oent out of Congress for the
re-cr ': ' n of this flaw Navy, and Congress was fa co- to accede
s because of the pressure t t they felt frc the
people; a result of his S'-illfu: >agandising in support of
a strong Navy pllcy. Here we see another instance of '~
civil leadership exerting political pressure beyond the
c ability or responsibility of the military professional in
order to install the r~ commendations of its technical nilite
•
advisers.
Several yeara of timid and caut3 1 leader-
ship had tightened the hold of the Nav t bure ' oy,
which now ruled with an iron h usually Ignorin e o-
times 11zing those within th^ structure who attempted to
introduce reforms am' innov tlons. Oongreas was more inter-
ested in Navy spoils than in n--val efficiency and with the lay
bllo apathetic as ever to the details of naval art and
science end with eautloua elderly officers staffing t
Kavy resitting change, Congress a ble to continue its
log-rolling utilization of nav l appropriations* The President
was unable to conquer Congress' nnvy yard policy but used it to
gain more capital ahipa for the y. Roos velt tenure of
office was far from peaceful in its relatioi a wit
1- 'ive body but he managed to gain the greatest advances
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for the Navy of any prior or succeeding President simply
because he maintained constant executive political leadership
in this program.
President Taft and his Secretary of the Navy G-. L.
•er, inherited from Roosevelt a resisting Congress, a depres-
sion, and a Treasury deficit. Coupling this with their own
political leadership weaknesses, they could do little to
intain the rate of a^S :ce of the Navy cause that Roosevelt
had established, but they did manage to improve the Navy within
itself in administration, efficiency and morale.
The apathy of the pub3 ic was too great to conquer and
on the surge of pacifism that was sweeping the country, Wilson
rode into the White House with Democratic parties in control
of both branches of Congress. The Democratic party was a
moderate navy party and even though the people were resistant
to any naval increase or even the continuation of the Navy at
its present size and cost, the party quietly went along with
a modified. Rooseveltian naval scheme. President Wilson brought
in Josephus Daniels from North Carolina to be his Secretary of
the Navy. Daniels had supported the Taft naval program and
now felt that the Navy of the United States should be con-
tinued along a "golden mean" between a large and small navy.
Daniels worked for industrialization of the naval yaros,
commercializing of the naval procurement problems, elimination
of inefficiencies of administration and operation of the 'aval
Establishment and for the developing of the Navy into a "great
university" for its officers and men.
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It should be remembered that during this reriod
submarines were introduced to the Navy, and although costly,
>:ere accepted wholeheartedly by Congress and the people because
they were to be utilized in coastal defense, a cause still dear
to the hearts of the legislators and the people since the
Revolutionary War. As well at the time came the innovation of
the naval form of the general staff to advise and thus ease
the burden of the Secretary of Navy in his control of the Navy.
The original plan called for a Chief of Naval Operations who,
with fifteen assistants, would be " responsible for the readi-
ness of the Navy for War and be charged with its general
direction" 1" but as finally enacted, the clause provided for
a Chief, without any assistants, "who shall, under the direc -
tion of the Secretary of the Navy , be charged with the
operations of the Fleet, and with preparation and readiness
of plans for its use in war." Evidently the Administration,
the party or legislators or both, were um*;illing to strengthen
the professional influence in the Navy Department.
To counteract the pacifism that hao again swept the
country a campaign of war propaganda was Instituted by the
ardent nationalists of the period. This campaign was so
Intense that the Naval Act of 1916, a naval program without
precedent in the entire world either in terms of money or
ships, wa6 passed with only fifty-one negative votes and ninety-
nine members not voting. This non-voting group was hesitant
16U.S., Songresslonpl Record , 63d Conn-., 3d Sess.
,




to place on record their previously voiced objections to the
bill for fen.r of the vilification that would be rained down
upon them for their lack of patriotism. Included in the
three hundred million dollar bill was the increased rank of
Admiral for the Chief of Naval Operations, the development of
a naval aviation corps and sums for its development and the
establishment of a procedure for the President to call a
conference to follow the end of the war to formulate "a -plan
for a court of arbitration" and "to consider the question of
disarmament." 1? Thus for the first time in our history we
have the complete mergence of naval policy and foreign policy
of the United States.
The lessons learned in World War I were, like the
lessons learned in all previous wars conducted by our nation,
immediately forgotten in the haste of the American public to
return to and enjoy those liberties that they had relinquished
in order to wage a successful battle against their enemies.
The Congress and the executive department, reflecting the
desires of the people, began to economize in all fields of
military activity and ev-n though knowing that such economies
were false and misleading and would only result in terrific
expenses for the future generations to recti fv these errors,
continued to attempt to answer the demands of the people and
save the economy of the nation for those future generations
by retaining as much of the military machine intact as possible.
*-7u.S.
, Congressional Record
, G&tfa Cong., 1st Seas,,
1916, LIII, Part II. 10922-12800.
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The disarmament programs of the twenties could only be
followed by the armament program of 193$ ami a following
increase in 1939> all leading to the nation's future partici-
pation in the truly World War of 1933-^5* a war that was to
tax the economy of our nation to its utmost, and change the
isolationist and neutral attitude of the American people to
one of increased awareness of their global responsibilities.
This feeling was apparent in the thirties for Newton Baker
stated in 1935
:
Complete economic isolation is impossible, and as
the United States has become one of the greater creditor
nations of the world, the financial arrangements which
will render the interchange of commodities between us and
other people possible are a matter of primary and continuing
concern to us. Such financi-1 arrangements mean financial
and economic stability in all parts of the world with which
we must trade or where it is to our advantage to trade.
From this it results that our own economic well being urges
us to an interest in every thing which can foster the
growth of international relations generally of a character
to make peaceful and profitable commerce possible. 1°
When the state of 'international relations became generally
of a nature to make peaceful and profitable commerce'
impossible , the nation began to exert political and economic
pressure u^on the international scene, and as these means
failed, measures approaching war were attempted but these
failed as well, World War II was the ultimate result.
With World War II, the Navy had another Roosevelt to
champion Its cause. The appropriation acts of 193$ began the
expansion of the Navy that was to become during the course of
the war the largest and most expensive naval machine yet known
1SNewton D. Baker, War in the Modern World (Boston:
Mifflin Co., 1935), P- 55.
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by the world. By the time of the actual outbreak of the
global war the entire people of the United States had begun
to realize their responsibilities toward the rost of the
world. The same air of pacifism and isolationism that crossed
the country prior to World War I was felt in less magnitude.
The political leaders of the nation led the military in its
expansion and convinced the majority of the civilian populace
that this was the correct action to take. The spoils system
of military procurement was partially eliminated but because
of the very great amount of military expenditures there were
not controls available to prevent favoritism in some of the
contracts issued. As the nation geared itself to almost
total war, the problem of whether the military controlled
itself and the nation or was controlled by the civil service
political-appointee was almost undefinable, for which was
civilian and which was military?
The positions of operational military control of the
Navy were combined early in the war, the Commander in Chief of
the United States Fleet was returned to the nerve center of
the war, Washington, and later combined with the position of
Chief of Naval Operations. He was ordered as "principle naval
advisor to the President and the Secretary of the Navy" and
to "have command of the operating forces with coordination and
direction of effort of the bureaus and offices." To counter
this strength of the military leader of the Navy the Secretary
was given assistant secretaries and retained control over
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procurement, contracting and production of materiel and naval
research, test, experimental and development activities. This
organization weathered the end of the war but due to its
obvious shortcomings and the changed attitudes of the people
it was due for another overhauling after the war hysteria had
Passed. The reorganizations of the military administration
following World War II were the most intensive yet attempted
by the American legislators. The cost of the military machine
had become so great and the need for the machine had become
so necessary in the minds of the American people that they
were forced to act and act judiciously. The world had become
compressed, our shores were now the shores of all nations and
the coastal defense-mercantile raider naval program had
disappeared from the minds of the people.
In 19^2, under the exigencies of war, the traditional
system of decentralization and independent authority which
had prevailed in the navy for a full century was finally
modified into an approximation of the centralized control
under a chief of staff which had long been advocated. Thus,
under the pressures of war and a continuing security crisis,
the President was led to adopt for the navy an administra-
tive system in which the need for military adequacy was
given priority over the fears for civil control which had
for so long blocked the step. . . Regardless of the appeal
the old order of things might have had for democratic
leadership in the Congress and the White House, the new
dimensions in the national security problem had made major
change necessary. . . The old policy of safeguarding civil
supremacy by "calculated dispersion" had to be laid aside
for a new policy which would give the departmental unity
and military energy requisite for the new situation faced
by the United States at midcentury. ul9
1
"Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 156.

CHAPTER III
MATURITY AND POST WORLD WAR II
The demobilization of the world's largest war machine,
the Armed Forces of the United States, at the conclusion of
the war with Japan was accomplished much quicker than anyone
had foreseen. Pressure was placed uron the nation to demobi-
lize its forces by foreign external sources, the legislators
of the nation in response to the appeali of its constituencies,
the Judicial, the executive and from within the military
itself. The Republican victory in the 19*1-6 Congressional
elections seemed to assure a non-military future for the nation
as had previous ante bellum party victories. But before the
war machine had collapsed completely came the ideological post-
war conflicts with the Soviet Union. The people of the
United States, retaining fresh in their memories their own
individu 1 participation in that war, were of one voice in
their desire to retain peace through the medium of strength.
Because of this attitude the 'cold war' launched by the Soviet
placed the American people in the mental attitude of an actual
physical war. Military policy and political legislation
followed this attitude and established a strong military force




Russian expansion* The foreign policy adopted reflected in
the maintenance of large armies of occupation in Germany and
Japan, and the continuance of strong naval and air bases
scattered throughout the world at strategic locations.
To support this strong military policy approximately
one-third of the total Federal Budget, about twelve billion
dollars, was appropriated directly for the Army and Navy in
l°'r7. This vast expenditure capability naturally gave the
military forces increasing influence in legislative affairs
and soon top military men moved Into the once civilian-held
positions, not only of influence but of actual authority,
within the administration structure, admiral William D. Leahy
stayed on at the White House as President Truman's personal
military advisor or private chipf of staff* General Marshall
replaced Jimmy Byrnes as Secretary of State, and inevitably
the department itself came more and more under military
control. Abroad in overseas diplomatic posts General W, B.
Smith was Ambassador to Russia, General Lucius Clay was High
Commissioner for Germany and General Douglas MacArthur High
Commissioner for Japan, all giving a very militaristic cast
to our nost-war international policies. At hone the establish-
ment of the National Security Council snd the unification of
the Armed Forces into a single department enabled the Secretary
of National Defense to x^ork in very close coordination with the
Secretary of State in determining all foreign policy."
^Herbert Croly, "The Effect on American Institutions
of a Powerful Military and Naval Establishment," Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science
,
LXVI
(July, 19 16) 157-72-

This rractical integration of military and diplomatic
policies was more evidence of the continued acceptance of the
doctrine of ^eace through strength. Following the acceptance
of this continued trend there could but follow the central-
ization of all authority, military control over the national
economy and ultimately the complete conscription of manpower
with which to feed the ever-hungry maw of military might.
With the passage of the National Security Act of 19^7, which
unified the Armed Servicer under one Secretary of Defense
and created the National Security Council, came the first
active effort of the legislature to halt the increasing onrush
of the nation toward a garrison state. ?1 Resistance on the
part of industry as well as the legislators was all that
prevented military control of the newly created Atomic Energy
Commission, the controlling authority of the strongest weapon
of war yet devised by man, the utilization of which for
peaceful purposes at this writing aonears to be the dawn of a
new age of the world. The civilian and military Special
Boards established under the act were given broad authority
and amrle funds to direct scientific research and allocate
Industrial production along military lines. This direction
of research and Industry was thought at first to be most
favorable to the progress of the military into absolute control
but has now, after the 19^9 amendments, proven to be a most
effective deterrent to the military in their aggressive on-
slaught into the fields of administrative control. These
2National Security >.ct of 19^7, Public Law 253 ,
30th Cong. f 1st Sees.. July ?6. 19*17. in U.S. Statutes at
Large
,
LXI, Part 1, Ofaap. 343, -95-plO.
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speclal civilian staffed boards comprised the major buffer to
their demands yet provided sufficient materials for their
requirements.
The military mind also Invaded the field of American
culture in such things as the G-I education bill, the expansion
of the R.O.T.C collegiate training urograms by all three of
the service?, the granting of scientific research program! to
universities ~-nd the entry into the educational fields of such
outstanding military men as our present President of the
United States, then President of Columbia University, General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, all did their part to contribute to the
dominance of the military.
Underlying these specific instances of military
supremacy in civilian fields, and an even more insidious threat
to civil controljwas the steadily growing military ability to
directly Influence both the public and the legislative bodies
of the nation. Stimulated by the continuous crisis-to-crisis
existence pervad.ing the Washington political arena, the
military exrert, the professional with his brilliant war record
and intimate knowledge of all nations of the world, impressed
the Congressman out of all proportion to the factual truths of
his observations. The Congressman, with his ear to the public's
sympathies toward a peace through strength program, listened
only to justify his vote, not to clarify it. As the prestige
of the military grew they began to flex their new muscles,
instituted lobby units and allocated large amounts to be spent
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in the area of public relations 1 , competing with each other
and propagandizing their own causes under the guise of
informing the public of what they should know about the world
and the United Stated.
This struggle to capture the public's sympathies
became most obvious in the presentations by the military for
the enactment of a conscription bill, commonly called Universal
Military Training. The U.M.T. squabble had its ups and downs
for each side; victory for the civilian in May 19^$ when the
wartime law was allowed to expire without extension, but
followed a month later by defeat when Congress passed a new
Selective Service Act.
The Act provided that the Secretary of Defense is the
"principal assistant to the President in all matters Pertaining
to the Department of Defense." Therefore he is established
as the Deputy Commander in Chief with Presidential power in all
military matters. There is not one aspect of the Department
of Defense that is beyond his authority and direction. He is
charged with the constitutional and traditional duty of
exercising civilian control of the Armed Forces in all matters.
Now, more than ever before, this duty is of prime importance,
and requires an individual of the greatest discernment to
discharge these responsibilities to the greatest benefit to
the nation. The Armed Forces' internal divisions of opinion
must be decided by the Secretary of Defense; these questions
?2Townsend Hoooes, "Civilian Military Balance,"
Yale Review
,
XLII (Winter, 195*0, 220-?5.
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ofttimes arising out cf problems that divide the Joint Chiefs
of Staff necessitating decisions by the Secretary in order
that the National Security Council may formulate the national
strates-y to give to the Joint Chiefs so that they may develop
their military plans to support it. Within this interlocking
ooc is ion-malting process the Secretary of Defense must Dlay as
a prejudiced judge, prejudiced in favor of the decision that
will be of most benefit to the American people and not neces-
sarily to any particular one of the services which he controls.
In fact, the majority of his difficult decisions arise from
differences of the opinion of the military bodies as to the
professional military merits of the case at hand and how to
solve the problem from the air-army-navy professional military
viewpoint, individual and separate and ofttimes so diverse as
to be extreme opposite ideas.
In April 1953> President Eisenhower laid the confusion
at issue directly before the Congress when he said "Basic
decisions relating to the military forces must be made by
politically accountable civilian officials. Conversely,
professional military leaders must not be thrust into the
political arena to become orey of partisan politics. " £-3 This
letter and the accompanying reorganization plan heralded a
significant change in policy for the military bureaucracy.
Here the President himself had come to the people through the
Congress in order to reestablish the civilian-military balance
23 T:
^?^es, loc. clt .
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into Its rightful proportions. This balance of professional
military a "vice and ultimate civilian responsibility in the
formulation and execution of foreign-military policy, or
national policy, is the problem which confronts the Secretary
of Defense throughout his tenure of office. The balance had
shifted to the military so the Fresident was forced to cone
to the rescue of the civilian Secretary and restore the balance
by legislative action, through the cooperation of Congress.
This confusion of control stemmed from the original
National Security Act of l?Kj wherein the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were given their statutory powers. They rapidly assumed
a semi-autonomous control u^on receiving these powers; they
planned and directed national policy, and, as the importance
of the military increased with the Korean War and the contin-
uous 'cold war' of the Soviet Republics, the power of the
civilian Secretaries decreased in proportion. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff assumed that they were separate from their services
and their service Secretaries and werr only responsible for the
military advice they were to rive to the Secretary of Defense
and the President. The development of their corporate military
judgments prevented their service Secretaries from any parti-
cipation in the planning of policy and forestalled their
attempts and abilities to question and analyze the decisions.
Hiding behind their solid front, the Joint Chief a allowed the
bitter inter-service rivalries to flourish anew without respon-
sibility and with some degree of assistance from their
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procedures. The Joint Chiefs placed additional obstacles in
the way of civilian control by their effective delegation of
control of the gigantic overseas activities of the military.
In accordance with the Key West Agreement of 19^& the world
theatres were distributed to each of the three servicea for
oontrol as executive agents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , and
the Joint Chiefs or Staff controlled the communications to
these executive agents, they were in absolute control.
i President, la his Reorganisation Plan No. 6,2"
Strengthened civilian responsibility and improved the machinery
of strategic planning* He asserted t Leaary powers of the
Secretary of Defense by stating
J
No function in any part of the Department of Defense
or in any of its component agencies should be performed
independent of the direction, authority, and control of
the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is the accountable
OiTilian head of the Department of Defense and under law,
my principle assistant in all matters relating to the
department. I want all to know that he lias my full backing
in that role.
In addition, the plan eliminated the Munitions Board and the
Research and Development Board and provided that these func-
tions shall be redistributed among five additional assistant
Secretaries of Defense (the sixth to handle legislative and
administrative affairs). The Key Vest Agreement was changed to
place the Secretary of Defense in the action position of
designating the areas to be controlled by which service,
therefore reaffirming the position of the Secretary in the
2*nIbid.

chain of command; President, Secretary of Defense, service
Secretary to military service. The President thereby elimi-
nated the Joint Chiefs as a contestant for control and placed
them beck In their original position of being his military
advisors. To continue, his letter regarding the reorganiza-
tion went on to say more about strategic planning and the
functions of civil control, "Our military plans are based
primarily on military factors but they must also take into
consideration a wider range of policy and economic factors
as well as the latest developments of modern science."
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is respon-
sible to the President for managing the Staff and Its several
subcommittees, and is responsible for the fullest cooperation
between the Staff substructure and the other parts of the
office of the Secretary of Defense in the early stages of staff
work on any major problem. Relegated to its nroper position
in the chain of command in the Defense structure, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff now become the most important link in the chain
which holds the military, economic and political policies of
the nation together in a combined and fully sutvorted national
policy. This reorganization of the executive department in
1953 gave the civilian balance of power the weight it needed
to return to its rightful position as the controller of the
Armed Forces. It brought the civilian Secretaries back to
their Position of authority and responsibility and Diaced them
and the several Assistant Secretaries of Defense and oth^r
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civilian experts back in the field of military planning; gave
the Secretary of Defense effective authority not only to
establish unified command but also to exercise strategic
command*
The reorganization r-.nti the resumption of civilian
Control accentuated Civilian responsibility for basic decisions
relating to the Armed Forces. It was not a new responsibility
but rather the reassertion of an old one that was rapidly being
obscured by the growth of military influence and responsi-
bility in the national life of these United States as well as
the legislative, executive and judicial arguments that had
arisen in the bitter and continuing struggle to bring the
nation's Armed Forces under a central authority.
There are other ways that will help Congress and the
3 > to D3 : 'rve their control. One is a careful pro-
scription of the powers of the principal military officers.
Ar.:t: ei lies, of coura
,
i> ; p of making or with-
h ldlng appropriations! in the past this power has been
sxeroised too rigidly at aoiae tla to:.- loosely at
others. A most important means of control is the reserved
rlgfht to confirm ar To- I ap Ointments. The most effec-
tive of all would i.e an insistence that the Secret- ry of
capable sivili LsYote his entire
talent and time to the duties of his office. ?5
Existing law grants the now elaborated powers to the Secretary
of Defense and his three service secretaries; this reorgani-
zation wns merely an action to shift the emphasis of authority
and responsibility back to the accountable civilian officials
where it belonged. In 19^7* vhen ^ne ac ^ was originated, and
in l r 4-9, when it was amended, these wasted years of service
p
^Alvin Brown, The Ar^or of Oiy:::n lotion (New York:
IUff ert Printintlng Co. , 1953), p. 298.
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strife, 1° L 9 to 1953> could have been prevented could they
h ve "been foreseen but it was not remotely suspected at that
ti e by the executive department that the cold war would reach
the intensity it has; that Korea would occur and that the
military would assert its power to the extent that the civilian
officials would yield so much of their effective power to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Ann by their hesltance and deference
to military opinion, admit the claim that only professional
military men could formulate m lltary policy."^ The year
1950 was a momentous one for the Naval Establishment. In the
beginning of the year the political idea was that the Navy was
too large for the ecor.omy of the nation and once again it was
placed on the auction bloclc. F ur years of cold war had
dulled the nation's senses and lulled it into a false sense of
security. Once again the aggressive tactics of a foreign
power saved the Navy from comnlete liquidation. The Communist
sponsored invasion of South Korea by the North Korean troops
in June of 195° presaged three years of war and truce negotia-
tions. The conduct of that war showed again the necessity for
command of the seas and silenced the argument that command of
the air was sufficient to maintain control, not without bring-
ing the basic truth out that wars are won by command of the
ground. Governmental and Defense spending reached an all-time
high during this short brush fire type of conflict and the
Defense Department, as reorganized, received a complete
Koopes, loc. clt .
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examlnation uron the efficiencies of th t reorganization.
Upon the introduction of truce talks the Republican Party,
3n an ante bellura wave of popularity, placed Gener 1 D. D.
Eisenhower in the White House. Eisenhower's platform was
based upon ending- the war in Korea and ^lacing the "overnment
on a more sound economic basis. The war in Korea was ended
but the Federal spending continued, mainly because the demands
of the military on the Federal Treasury had increased because
of increased mechanization of war and the resultant increases
in the cost of maintaining a defense force equipped with modern
mechanized equipment.
President Eisenhower, after testing the organization
of the Department of Defense by observation of its workings,
felt that it needed additional reorganization in order to
control the ever-increasing costs of its operation. In April
of 195^ he presented a JOQQ word letter to Congress stating
his views. Congress at the same time had been feeling out the
grass roots of their constituencies and was of the same
opinion but had nlanned a somewhat different attack ur>on the
pr blem. The situation at present is in a stalemate but from
the military point of view, there will be a definite reorgani-
zation of sc lar lines of authority within the Department
because the President is empowered to do so by administrative
-recesses. Eisenhower is not a Theodore or Franklin Roosevelt.
He does not have the Congress in the o-?l r of his hand nor does
he hav c> the people listening- to his voice. His program will
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In ail probability become effective only ecause the legis-
rs are generally in accord with the basic promises of the
program as he states:
1. We must organise our fig' tin forces into opera-
tional commends that are truly unified, each assigned a
mission in full accord with our overall objectives.
2. We must clear command channels so that orders will
proceed directly to unified commands from the Commander in
Chief and the Secretary of Defense.
3. V/e must strengthen the staff of the office of the
Secretary of Defense in or-er to provide the Commander in
Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional
assistance they need for strategic planning and for
operational direction of the unified co 3.
k. We must continue the three military departments as
agencies Ifithin the Departneit of De'ense to administer a
wide range of functions.
5. We must reorganize the research and development
functions of the Department in order to make the best use
of our scientific and technological resources.
6. We must remove all doubts as to the full authority
of the Secretary of Defense. 27
Tiiis suggested reorganization stresses unified commands and the
control of those commands by the Secretary of Defense, rele-
gating the Service Secretaries to responsibilities of other
t an operational military nature. The President amplified his
points presented above particularly in respect to the adminis-
tration of funds by the Secretary of Defense. He states:
I strongly urge that; in the future the Congress make
appropriations for this Department in such a nature as to
provide the Secretary of Defense adequate authority and
flexibility to discharge his heavy responsibilities.
The ^resident is therefore requesting that Congress authorize
27 M The President's Message to Congress on Reorganiza-




money to the Secretary c Defense for all military purposes
rather than to the individual services separate! Congress
will not yield this rower of fund control ovf-r t' e services,
for in it lies the only absolute control of the military that
resides in the legislature, and She only Immediate way in which
the voice of the people ©an be Immediately > -,-. j by the
legislators. Each Department of the government would like to
have absolute authority over the expenditure of funds author-
ized but since the beginning of this nation Congress has
tenaciously retained its absolute power of the purse.
The first three items on the program are attempts on
the part of the President to decentralize the overwhelmingly
large organization that the Defense Department has become.
The National Security Act a; 5 amended unifies and standardizes
the procedures and policies of the Department. In effecting
this unification and standardization there was a definite
tendency on all concerned to centralize authority, a tendency
that led to the creation of too large a problem for any one
man or one staff to control. The present unified command
emphasis is an attempt to separate the Department into units
with common programs, containing the similar parts of all the
separate services, all directed in a concerted effort to a.
common goal in charge of a commander from any service. This
is similar to the situation in industry where, although the
subsidiaries and branches of a company follow the same business




profits are a result of their own management skill. They are
controlled by the Board of Directors of the parent company and
answer to them for their gross errors but absorb their own
losses into their own gains.
This decentralization is not appreciated by Congress
for they feel that it will decentralize responsibility and
there will be no one person or group available for cens <re or
commendation. They cannot appreciate the fact that the Defense
Department has grown to a size beyond their control and are
very hesitant about attempting any changes in the historical
processes now in effect. They fear too the creation of an
office, manned by a political appointee, that would have such
great spending power as would the Secretary of Defense. As it
now stands they feel that they can control the spending habits
of the three separate Secretaries and have installed sufficient
mechanical controls to aid in this direction. To have all of
the forty billion dollars under the control of one : an, as
they see it, would create s situation that would be dangerous
to the liberties of the r>e-rle of the nation. Their policy in
this respect is still the sa e policy of the First Congress;
founded upon the distrust of the military and because of this
distrust utilizing every nower possible to prevent the military
from the assumption of absolute control.
Within the military organization itself this urogram
will call for so^e drastic changes in concepts and approaches
to mutual problems by the military leaders. Senior m'litary
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officers are no longer only marksmen, pilots or shlphandlers.
They are to be competent and well trained . n- ers of large,
complex and diverse organizations, ^hey shall be required to
hrve a broad military, political and com ercial background to
fulfill this requirement. Their single service loylties must
be diverted to a national loyalty at an early stage of their
careers in order that they might develop into a niche of this
new concept.
The staff of the Secret ry of Defense, like the Board
of Directors of a lar e corporation, must consist of the best
military and civ'lian talent available, well experienced in
all fields of military and civilian endeavors. If Congress
will recognize the essentiality of this decentralization and
content itself with measures of results rather than insisting
upon uniform procedures, detailed financial reporting, and
consultation unon operational decisions, this staff can utilize
the unified commands and separate department! of t> e services





In a democracy, business inter-sts and Individual
freedom ought to predominate, and military groups, by their
very nature, threaten business interests, individual freedoms
and the general welfare.
In point of fact, civilian supremacy is sever in
abeyance un-er the American form of "overn ent; the
civil authority does not abdicate in time of war or any
other crisis. Indeed it is precisely in time of war—when
gre~t decisions must be reached involving the issue of
survival, the scoDe of hostilities, and the form of peace
settlement—that the civil authority must most vigorously
assert its supremacy. A president having confidence in his
military commanders will normally refrain from interference
in their conduct of ourely m'litary operations. But he and
his Secretary of Defense will most assuredly exercise
control over t ose military matters that contain broad
political Impllc tions and consequences. Tney have the
clearest authority and obligation to do so. 2^
Therefore, except during actual comb- t, the suppression and
regression of military institutions by whatever means necessary
and possible and available is justified. "Creeping mili-
tarism"^ is not militarism in the designed state li e that on
the Prussian order; it is an unanticip ted militarism that
slowly and insidiously develooes from the lack of effective
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establishment; the isolation between the civil and military
leadership and the failure of the civil servant and the
la islator to act relevantly and consistently. As a result the
extens on of the tasks and powers of the military is encouraged
and stimulated by such aborteomin
j
The top military leaders of the military are not all
affected in the same manner nor do they all react in the same
manner to this stimulus. These members who h;ve risen to
flag rank because of their outstanding performances in the
operational and technical field are conforming to the age-old
premise of step by step accession to command by the command of
men in battle. They are the ideal professional soldier,
devoted to country and to organization, a passive technical
civil servant who can be indoctrinated and made accountable
for only the military consequences of his actions. It is the
smaller group of the top military leaders who might be
considered the absolute leaders of the military, who have
strengthened and enlarged the field of this cree ing militarism.
Military institutions are being oivllianised in all respects so
why should not there arise a military-politician :~roup such as
this? The nation has insisted on modern management, budgeting,
statistical control, conference procedures, auditing and the
human relations approach in the military as is applied in
modern industry. e now see the old-time limited perspective,
isolated and aloof, professional military nan being sun-
planted by the more informed, gregarious and socially
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acceptable individual professional technician. The increased
technical aspects of military training and future employment
in war has placed the emphasis uron initiative rather than the
strict enforcement of discipline; highly skilled men require
high motivation that must be nurtured and nourished by skillful
leadership; a definite departure fro" the cherished traditions
of military spit and polish discipline. Thus social relations,
personal leadership, material benefits, Ideological indoctrina-
tions and the justice and meaningfulness of the war aims of the
nation are all component parts of the morale of the military
and the major concern of the tor military commanders. In order
to have these men in top command, the military h*s completely
renov ted their graduate and undergraduate school systems to
produce the desired result and in that result have realized the
final product as a political-militarist, a top level military
leader, well schooled in the basic humanities and experienced
in the fields of civilian political affairs, flexible, persua-
sive and a master at the gentle art of manipulation, still
loyal to his country and his organization but willingly devoted
to the advancement of the military causes. Ti ey are staff
artists, blighted only sllg tly by the exposure to command of
operational forces. Public relations in the field of mass
Persuasion and mass manipulation techniques are their forte and
lead them irrevocably into the field of active political
maneuvering while adroitly operating under the guise of
develo- >ing public support for military establishment policies.

-57-
?Ms activity is ofttlr.es thinly disguised by the state eat
: t they re only attem ting to inform the public and not
emptlng to lead or direct their in any direction:
j infomed n is a strong nation" conceptual approach* 3°
Given the new international responsibilities of nited
:tes and tYe probabilities of protract rid tensions, the
the proper relationship of the civilian executive
and the military head will continue to require the attentl
of tl riean people for many years to core. Essentially
the problem has arisen from the ev :\ tion of the m?>ny f
and facets of ailltary participation in -alks of t;
^rican scene of life* The Impact of t. I litary 1 t upon
y of the nation Is twice felt because of tfc of
tion that the expenditure of th t budget reflects*
le tJiis is not true of all expenditures of the military, in
the in its expenditures are for those end items t ; ve
little or no use or applio tion wit; in the civilian eoonomyj
t ey Just go Hboom M and thr; t segment of the ec ncmy is lost
forever.
The problem of the prcoess of the military is minor
—
its aotual physical voice can bo effectively stilled by legis-
lative r>roces". It is the factual force of the nllits
machine that is awsome. Some label it "creeping militaris- , "31
the orocess by which the civilian Secretary, after but few
3°Smitn, on, clt.
, p. 2
*' Hi loc. clt .
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months In harness, becomes Imbued with the spirit of the
milit-ry service which he represents and becomes its champion,
loudly heralding the valiant record of that particular service,
championing its military causes with a vigor that the seasoned
military professional saves for more arduous military cam-
paigns, all to the extent that he forgets that his office
charges him with the responsibility to exert control over the
service for the benefit of the people rather than to afford
the military service a new and politically strong champion of
its desires. The maintenance of the constitutional principle
of civilian supremacy must be founded upon formal rules and
procedures such as the presrntly strengthened executive and
legislative budgetary control, the executive appointive powers
in appointing strong representative civilian Secretaries of
the services, the specific allocation of responsibilities by
the legislative branch and all of the actual rules and proce-
dures which govern civil and military relationships in their
multitudinous and diverse situations. Civilian supremacy must
be precisely defined and vigorously defended, not as only a
formal orindole, but in the actual day to day official and
personal conduct of civil and military personnel as they go
about each day's business.
There is no possibility today, if there ever w-s, of
achieving a neat and precise dividing line between poli-
tical and military considerations in the concrete
situations that face us around the world. In fact, it is
more complicated than that? there are no lines of clear
demarcation among the military, economic, political and
psychological aspects of any complex world problem.

-We live in a world ?f rlzQi ;,r. There are
only two centers of c oe and there, unhappily for
lad, re t irreconcilable Leal syste s« This
mea s that the two centers must Inevitably compete for the
rest of tj. i irorld, because neither can permit the other to
organise the rest of the world against it. The cold war
is ill essence a Straggle for the third areas. Tjhe ar r ~s in
between the two great powers* . . . The United States is
low 6 ft - very center of b power struggle, whereat in
the past we have been on the frin-es.3?
Military objectives may be Incompatible with nonmilitary
objectives, requiring an immediate decision by the controlling
authority* These decisions must be made from competing tech-,
niques or strategies— the use of military force as opposed to
diplomatic or economic persuasion, or total military endeavors
versus limited 'police' actions. Mlli' ary techniques may
drastically affect the planned nonmilitary objectives of the
executive and the legislator.
Thus the problem becomes one of coordination, the
proper blending of the functions, information and viewpoints,
of the military and civilian strata of activity all directed
toward the one course for the ship of state which will truly
be for the comrron welfare of the people. The merging of the
civilian and military elements toward a successful fruition of
effort must retain the principle of civilian suoremacy, yet
not to the extent that the voice of the military is drowned
out completely. The military should not be forced to resort
to political activity in oner to oreserve its position. To
both the career civil servant ranking below the political
ointee and the m ' litary regular, such a course is fraught




only with early oblivion or the loss of usefulness in his
field.
The problem cf tj 8 proper role f nilltary i
democracy is many sided. There is not one sure panacea.
Formal rules, organization and reform* are Insufficient. The
legislator, the executive ' the military must achieve a
eater awareness of the nature of the problems which srise
out of their relationships and each must attain a deeper
understanding f their responsibilities to each other and to
the American people. The danger from the military is not, by
the greatest stretch of the - tion, to be cmsidered to
be the physical usurpation of power and the creation of a
military dictatorship. It is the unappropriate application of
military values, information and interpret Lon at the vital
•pints of the decision making processes of the executive,
legislative and judicial brand, el of the movernment 11 as
the rhenomenon cf "creeping militarism" amon civilian
executives at all levels. V.re can conclude that the true cause
cf military inroads upon civilian supremacy has been the
failure of Civilians to disch-r£e their responsibilities
properly.
Ultimately, the major responsibility for establishing
the conditions conducive to the necessary, effective and
limited participation cf the military in governmental
decision asking must rest ta oa the top civilian leaders,
including the President of the United States. 33
The civilian must clsrify tie role of the military, enforce
"B. . Sapln and . . C. Snyder, The Role of the
Military in American Foreign ; ollcy (Garden City, N.Y.
:








self-restraint in political activities and enforce nonmilitary
commercial and humanitarian educ tlon upon the military in
order that they might be enabled to more efficiently perform
their nonmilitary duties. They must continue to enforce the
required checks end balances to assure adequate controls and
must insist that the military conduct its affairs in an open
and forthright manner as far as the national security permits,
In consonance with the standard practices of com; ercial
activities and other governmental activities. Civilians must
decide for themselves what their own supremacy actually is;
t; ey must enumerate their responsibilities and insist upon
their prerogatives and be accountable for their actions. They
must clarify their own roles, exercise self-restraint in
itical activities (except for the political appointee whose
very function is political), and attain a degree of military
training that will allow then to understand and evaluate the
military point of view and methodology.
In elimination, tho legislative actions directly affect-
ing military control throughout the history of the nation h-ve
all been specifically directed at placing limits u^on the extent
of that control. This infers that the civilian has unlimited
control possibilities but has neglected to assert them to the
extent that Congress has been forced to come to his rescue by
direct legislation. The civil servant and the political
appointee occupying positions of authority have failed their
duty to the nation in allowing the military to enlarge their
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spheres of influence and lin^s of authority. No amount of
organization or reorganization of the Defense Department will
prevent this gradual usurpation of civilian oowers by the
military; only the greatest attention to duty and conscien-
tiousness of effort on the part of the civilian bureaucracy
will hold it in check. The po-er of the military rises and
falls with its popularity; this nopul rity is dependent upon
the fe rs of the r^eo^ie of the nation and those fears are
governed by the degree of safety they feel for their liberties.
Therefore it is incumbent ur>on the civili-n head of the mili-
tary establishment of the United States to continually insure,
by whatever means i ossible, that the liberties of the ^eo-le
are not in danger from external or internal threats, if he
desires to retain his rightful position of authority and
control.
However, the necessity for the rise of the military to
full power at timefl must not be disregarded. Aa the nation's
economic sphere benefits from the elimination of marginal
activities and wasteful policies by the cyclical Impact of
recessions and degressions so does the civilian-military
bureaucracy require an occasional revolutionary house cleaning.
HA nation with an inflexible military system, determined by a
national constitution and controlled by civilian politicians
will soon end by having no military forces in spirit or
capacity."^
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